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Abstract Studies in humans and rodents have suggested that
behavior can at times be Bgoal-directed^—that is, planned,
and purposeful—and at times Bhabitual^—that is, inflexible
and automatically evoked by stimuli. This distinction is cen-
tral to conceptions of pathological compulsion, as in drug
abuse and obsessive-compulsive disorder. Evidence for the
distinction has primarily come from outcome devaluation
studies, in which the sensitivity of a previously learned behav-
ior to motivational change is used to assay the dominance of
habits versus goal-directed actions. However, little is known
about how habits and goal-directed control arise. Specifically,
in the present study we sought to reveal the trial-by-trial dy-
namics of instrumental learning that would promote, and pro-
tect against, developing habits. In two complementary exper-
iments with independent samples, participants completed a
sequential decision task that dissociated two computational-
learning mechanisms, model-based and model-free. We then
tested for habits by devaluing one of the rewards that had
reinforced behavior. In each case, we found that individual
differences in model-based learning predicted the participants’
subsequent sensitivity to outcome devaluation, suggesting that
an associative mechanism underlies a bias toward habit for-
mation in healthy individuals.
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In neuroscience and psychology, behavior is thought to rely
on contributions from at least two instrumental decision sys-
tems, one Bgoal-directed^ and another Bhabitual^ (Dickinson,
1985). The goal-directed system learns about the contingency
between actions and outcomes and ensures that behavior is
appropriate given our current desire for these outcomes.
When we learn new complex tasks, such as how to drive,
our goal-directed system is actively engaged as we plan each
maneuver. With practice, however, components of this task
require less effort, and we find ourselves, for instance, chang-
ing gears or dimming lights automatically, which allows us to
allocate attention to more important things (e.g., pedestrians).
This automaticity reflects the contribution of our habit
system, which is thought to enable actions that have been
rewarded many times in the past to be Bstamped in,^ such
that they can be rendered automatic in the future.
Although the ability to form habits is useful for routine
tasks such as driving, too much reliance on habits can be
problematic when responding to changing circumstances in
which flexibility is required: for example, when we go
abroad and must overcome the well-established habit of
driving on a particular side of the street. More seriously,
an accumulation of evidence has suggested that excessive
habit learning is central to disorders of compulsivity, in-
cluding obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD; Gillan &
Robbins, 2014) and substance dependence (Dickinson,
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Wood, & Smith, 2002; Sjoerds et al., 2013), which are
characterized by cycles of maladaptive, repetitive behavior.
The existence of these two systems, and assays of their
relative control over behavior in different circumstances or
populations, are largely inferred from post-training outcome
devaluation procedures (Adams&Dickinson, 1981), in which
the value of a desirable outcome is reduced—for example,
through selective satiety (Balleine & Dickinson, 1998;
Tricomi, Balleine, & O’Doherty, 2009) or taste aversion
(Adams & Dickinson, 1981). The ability to alter behavior
when an outcome’s value changes demonstrates that a repre-
sentation of the expected consequences of an action is guiding
our choices, the hallmark of goal-directed control. Conversely,
continued responding in spite of outcome devaluation is the
defining feature of habits. Using outcome devaluation, it has
been established that habits can become dominant following
practice or Bovertraining^ (Adams, 1982; Tricomi et al.,
2009), when the action–outcome contingency is lessened
(Dickinson, Nicholas, & Adams, 1983), and also under condi-
tions of stress (Schwabe & Wolf, 2009) and associative inter-
ference (de Wit, Niry, Wariyar, Aitken, & Dickinson, 2007).
Moreover, the outcome devaluation methodology has been uti-
lized to delineate neural loci associated with the motivational
sensitivity of behavior in both humans and rodents (Balleine &
O’Doherty, 2010). Although the caudate nucleus (or
dorsomedial striatum, in rodents) and the ventromedial prefron-
tal cortex (vmPFC) promote outcome-sensitive action selection
(de Wit, Corlett, Aitken, Dickinson, & Fletcher, 2009; de Wit
et al., 2012; Valentin, Dickinson, & O’Doherty, 2007; Yin,
Ostlund, Knowlton, & Balleine, 2005), the putamen (or dorso-
lateral striatum, in rodents) is thought to act in an opposing
direction, supporting habit formation (Tricomi et al., 2009;
Yin, Knowlton, & Balleine, 2004).
Although it is clear that the outcome devaluation technique
has been extremely fruitful (having arguably laid the founda-
tion for this entire field of study), it suffers from one key
limitation: It cannot determine whether outcome-insensitive
behaviors arise due to a strengthening of stimulus–response
habits, a weakening of goal-directed choices, or a combination
of both. More importantly, because this methodology exam-
ines only previously acquired behaviors, it does not speak to
the learning mechanisms that give rise to either system’s ten-
dencies, and in particular, it does not reveal how experiences
during learning (such as the amount or the nature of training)
ultimately produce a dominance of goal-directed or habitual
actions. In the present study, we sought to connect goal-
directed and habitual behaviors to learning mechanisms that
have been hypothesized to produce them.
A popular computational framework posits that two update
rules operate in parallel to learn action preferences during
trial-and-error instrumental learning, known as Bmodel-
based^ and Bmodel-free^ reinforcement learning (Daw, Niv,
& Dayan, 2005; Keramati, Dezfouli, & Piray, 2011; Pezzulo,
Rigoli, & Chersi, 2013). These theories formalize and gener-
alize classical associative-learning conceptions of instrumen-
tal behavior, which envision goal-directed and habitual
choices as arising from learned action–outcome or stimulus–
response associations, respectively (Dickinson & Balleine,
1994). Suggesting a neural grounding for these behaviors,
the model-free system is based on temporal difference learn-
ing theories (Sutton & Barto, 1998) of the dopaminergic mid-
brain, which suggest that one way in which actions acquire
value is based on their history of reward, a process associated
with phasic changes in the firing rate of dopamine neurons in
the midbrain (Schultz, Dayan, & Montague, 1997). In con-
trast, model-based computations achieve greater accuracy and
flexibility by evaluating candidate actions or sequences of
actions on the basis of a learned cognitive map (the epony-
mous Bmodel^) of their predicted outcomes (Tolman, 1948),
and combining these predictions with separately learned in-
formation about the current incentive values of those out-
comes (Doya, 1999; Gläscher, Daw, Dayan, & O’Doherty,
2010). The contributions of these two learning rules to trial-
by-trial preference adjustments are distinguishable when
learning multistep decision tasks, and the hallmarks of both
rules have been reported in both human (Daw, Gershman,
Seymour, Dayan, & Dolan, 2011) and rodent (Akam,
Dayan, & Costa, 2013; Miller, Erlich, Kopec, Botvinick, &
Brody, 2014) behavior. The relative contributions of these
mechanisms to learning vary according to individual differ-
ences (Daw et al., 2011), aging (Eppinger, Walter, Heekeren,
& Li, 2013), and psychiatric disorders (Voon et al., 2014).
Moreover, individual differences in the propensity for
model-based (over model-free) choice are positively correlat-
ed with gray matter volume in the vmPFC and caudate (Voon
et al., 2014), regions that are critical for goal-directed control
over action, in particular.
It has been proposed, though so far largely on theoretical
grounds, that these two frameworks coincide: Specifically,
that model-free and model-based learning (respectively) give
rise to habits and goal-directed actions, as operationalized by
devaluation sensitivity. This is because model-free learning is
based entirely on one’s prior experience with reward, and
therefore cannot use new information about the outcome value
(including devaluation) to guide choices. Conversely, model-
based selection should be associated with greater goal-
directed sensitivity to devaluation, due to the online incorpo-
ration of outcome value information into choices between
candidate actions (Daw et al., 2005; Dolan & Dayan, 2013).
Thus, we set out to test whether these two constructs are in-
deed related, which (if it were true) would have implications
for the learning processes that produce or protect against
habits.
In Experiment 1, we tested these hypotheses in 90 partici-
pants recruited online using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk
(AMT). The participants first completed two simultaneous
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two-step reinforcement-learning tasks that previously have
been used to dissociate the contributions of model-based and
model-free learning to choice behavior (Daw et al., 2011;
Otto, Gershman, Markman, & Daw, 2013; Otto, Raio,
Chiang, Phelps, & Daw, 2013). The tasks were structurally
equivalent, but they were each associated with distinct re-
wards. Subsequently, we devalued one of these rewards (but
not the other) and measured whether participants’ instrumen-
tal behavior would update in light of this change in the out-
come value. Specifically, we assessed the extent to which
participants would withhold responding toward devalued re-
wards, but continue to respond in order to gain still-valuable
rewards. We then tested whether individual differences in the
signatures of model-based and/or model-free learning during
sequential decision-making were predictive of the devaluation
sensitivity of the associations thereby acquired, revealing trial-
by-trial learning mechanisms that contribute to, and/or protect
against, forming habits. To verify our results, in Experiment 2
we carried out a conceptual replication study with 95 new
participants. Here, we probed whether the learned preference
for one action over another (within a single two-step choice
task) was sensitive to devaluation, and tested whether this
sensitivity was related to model-based and model-free learn-
ing, as in Experiment 1. This allowed us to explicitly test
whether sensitivity to devaluation relates to the manner in
which associations are learned through experience.
Experiment 1
Method
Participants This study was conducted online using
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (AMT). Recruitment and exclu-
sion was conducted on a rolling basis until a target sample size
of 90 participants had been reached. It was necessary to recruit
111 participants to meet this target. As has been suggested for
behavioral experiments on AMT, we defined the following a
priori exclusion criteria to ensure data quality (Crump,
McDonnell, & Gureckis, 2013; Simcox & Fiez, 2014).
Participants were excluded (but still paid) if they missed more
than 10 % of the trials (n = 18), had implausibly fast reaction
times (i.e., ±2 SDs from the mean; n = 2), or responded with
the same key on more than 90 % of trials (n = 1). The partic-
ipants were recruited from the USA only, had been paid for
95 % of their previous work on AMT, and were 18 years of
age or older. In all, 42 males and 48 females were included in
the study, with ages ranging from 18 to 63 (M = 33.15 years,
SD = 10.96). They were paid $2 for participation, in addition
to a bonus payment that reflected the proportion of coins
earned during training (M = $0.53, SD = 0.04). Participants
could not take part in the experiment more than once or restart
the experiment.
In order to obtain reliable learning data fromAMT, a recent
study suggested that it is necessary that participants first pass a
comprehension test (Crump et al., 2013). This ensures that all
those taking part have read and understood the instructions.
Our participants needed 100% accuracy on a seven-item com-
prehension test (provided in the supplementary materials) in
order to take part in the present study. If any item was an-
swered incorrectly, participants were sent back to the begin-
ning of the instructions. They could not progress to the main
test or become eligible for payment unless they passed this
test. There was no constraint on the number of times that
participants could repeat the instructions prior to taking part.
Reinforcement learning task On each trial, participants
were presented with a choice between two fractals, each of
which commonly (70 %; see Fig. 1A, white arrows) led to a
particular second state displaying another fractal. These
second-state fractals were termed Bcoin-boxes,^ since they
each had some probability (between .25 and .75) of being
rewarded with a coin worth 25¢. On 30 % of trials (Brare^
transition trials; Fig. 1A, gray arrows), choices uncharacteris-
tically led to the alternative second state. A purely model-free
learner would make choices irrespective of the transition
structure of the task (i.e., whether a transition was rare or
common), and would only show sensitivity to whether or
not the last action had been rewarded (Fig. 1B). A model-
based strategy, in contrast, is characterized by sensitivity to
both prior reward and the transition structure of the task. For
example, take the case in which a choice is followed by a rare
transition to a second state, and that second state is rewarded.
In this situation, a model-based learner would tend to switch
choices on the next turn, because this would be more likely to
return the learner to that second state (Fig. 1C). A model-free
learner would make no such adjustment based on the transi-
tion type.
Before starting the task, participants completed a training
session, which comprised written instructions (provided in full
in the supplementary materials), the viewing of 20 trials dem-
onstrating the probabilistic association between the second-
stage fractals and coin rewards, and completion of 20 trials
of active practice with the probabilistic transition structure of
the task. The number of times that participants failed the com-
prehension test that followed these instructions was used as a
covariate in our subsequent analyses, accounting for general
comprehension ability.
To permit comparisons of behavior in relation to devalued
and nondevalued rewards (described later), participants
played two interleaved two-step Markov decision process
(MDP) games, for gold and silver coins, respectively. At the
start of each trial, participants entered either of two possible
conditions (games), gold or silver. These were entirely inde-
pendent of one another and were discriminable by the choices
available (fractal images), the color of the border on the screen
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(gold or silver), and the type of coin available in that condition
(Fig. 1A). Participants were instructed that any coins they
earned during the task would be stored in a container of the
corresponding color and converted to money at the end of the
experiment. However, they were also informed that these con-
tainers stored a finite number of coins and that once a contain-
er became full, they would not be able to keep any more coins
of that color.
Participants had 2.5 s in which to make a response using
the left (BE^) and right (BI^) keys following presentation of
the first-state choice. If no response was made within the time
window, the words Bno response^were presented in the center
of the screen in red letters, and the next trial started. It cost 1¢
(0.01 USD) to make a choice on each trial, and B–1¢^ was
presented in red letters at the top right of the screen after each
choice was made, to denote the cost incurred. If a choice was
made, the selected fractal moved to the top center of the screen
and shrunk in size. A new, second-state fractal appeared in the
center of the screen and was followed by a coin or a zero,
indicating that the participant had not been rewarded on that
trial. The probability that each second-stage fractal would be
followed by a coin changed slowly over trials (independent
Gaussian randomwalks, SD = 0.025, with reflecting boundary
conditions at 25 % and 75 %). Note that similar tasks used
previously had contained an additional choice between two
more options at each second-stage state, which was eliminated
25¢ 25¢ 25¢ 25¢
42% 67% 51% 31%
70%
(common)
70%
(common)
70%
(common)
70%
(common)
30%
(rare)
30%
(rare)
A 
1s
2.5s
1s
Model-Based Model-Free B C 
Fig. 1 Experiment 1: Reinforcement-learning task. Participants entered
one of two start states on each trial, whichwere associated with the receipt
of gold and silver coins, each worth 25¢. Participants had 2.5 seconds (s)
to make a choice, costing 1¢, which would commonly (70 %) lead them
to a certain second state and rarely lead them to the alternative second
state (30 %). No choices were made to the second state; each second state
has a unique probability of reward that slowly changed over the course of
the experiment. (B) Graph depicting a purely model-free learner, whose
behavior is solely predicted by reinforcement history. (C) A purely
model-based learner’s behavior, in contrast, is predicted by an interaction
between reward and transition, such that behavior would mirror the
model-free learner only when the transition from the initial choice to
the outcome was common. Following rare transitions, a purely model-
free learner would show the reverse pattern
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here for simplicity. Since the effect of model-based learning is
mediated by the state identity—rare or common—this did not
affect the logic of the task or its analysis.
Devaluation procedure Once 200 trials of the sequential
decision-making task had been completed, participants were
informed that one of the containers became full, devaluing that
coin type such that collecting these coins could no longer add
money to their take-home bonus (Fig. 2B). Since it cost 1¢
(0.01 USD) tomake a choice on each trial of the game, when a
coin becomes devalued, an individual who behaves in a goal-
directed manner should withhold responding in the condition
associated with the devalued coins in order to avoid the un-
necessary loss of 1¢ per trial. In contrast, if the habit system
has gained control over action, an individual should continue
to respond in both valued and devalued conditions at a cost of
1¢ per trial.
To exclude the possibility that new learning contributed to
devaluation test performance, outcomes were not shown to
participants during the test stage (Fig. 2A; de wit et al.,
2009; Tricomi et al., 2009). Participants were warned about
this change in task procedure, told that they would no longer
see the results of their choices (i.e., whether or not they got a
coin), but apart from that, nothing about the game had
changed. We gave participants four trials with no feedback
prior to devaluing one of the coins. This was done in order
to allow participants the opportunity to learn about the change
in feedback delivery prior to devaluation (and so not to con-
flate the two). Participants were alerted to this change in pro-
cedure: They were informed that the task would continue as
before, but that they would no longer be shown the results of
their choices. Following these trials, a screen indicated to par-
ticipants that one of their containers (counterbalanced across
participants) was completely full (Fig. 2B). A total of 20 post-
reinforcer devaluation trials were presented in this test—ten
trials per state, presented in a random order.
Consumption test Outcome devaluation studies in rodents
and humans have typically used primary reinforcers such as
food to test the efficacy of devaluation by testing actual con-
sumption of the item. Since the devaluationmanipulation used
in the present study was symbolic, we carried out an analo-
gous consumption test to quantify the extent to which the
devaluation manipulation was effective in reducing the incen-
tive value of the devalued coin. Following the devaluation
procedure, in which participants were shown that one of their
containers was full, they were instructed that they would be
given 4 s to collect as many coins as they pleased from a
B 
A 
C 
!
FULL! 
Fig. 2 Experiment 1: Devaluation and consumption tests. (A) The 24-
trial devaluation stage consisted of presentations of the first-stage choices
only; that is, participants did not transition to the second stages and never
learned the outcomes of their choices. This ensured that responding dur-
ing the devaluation test was dependent only on prior learning. They were
informed that the task would continue as before, but that they would no
longer be shown the results of their choices. (B) After four trials of
experience with the concealed trial outcomes, one type of coin was
devalued by informing participants that the corresponding container
was completely full. (C) This trial was followed by a consumption test,
in which participants had 4 s to freely collect coins using their mouse.
Next they completed the 20 test trials, in which habits were quantified as
the difference between the numbers of responses made to the valued and
devalued states
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display of gold and silver coins (ten each; Fig. 2C) by clicking
with their mouse. If devaluation was effective, participants
should collect more of the valued than of the devalued coins.
During the main task—specifically, at Trials 105 and
135—participants received warnings that the to-be-devalued
and then the to-remain-valued container, respectively, were
half-full. These warning trials were followed by consumption
tests. This served to familiarize participants with the finite
storage capacity of the containers and consumption test pro-
cedure prior to devaluation.
Data analysis Logistic regression analyses were conducted
using mixed-effects models implemented with the lme4 pack-
age in the R programming language, version 3.0.2 (http://cran.
us.r-project.org). The model tested for the effects of reward
(coded as rewarded 1, unrewarded –1) and transition type
(coded as common 1, rare –1) on the preceding trial in
predicting each trial’s choice (coded as switch 0 and stay 1,
relative to the previous choice). States were treated
independently (i.e., had distinct stimuli and reward
probabilities), and as such were treated independently in the
analysis. For example, for a given trial in which participants
made a choice in the gold state, the reward and transition
variables in the model pertained to the previous trial
experienced in the gold state, not necessarily the last trial
experienced by the participant (which might have been in
the silver state). In other words, if a participant made a
choice in the gold state, we were interested in the extent to
which their prior experience in that gold state had influenced
the current choice. Within-subjects factors (the intercept, the
main effects of reward and transition, and their interaction)
were taken as random effects—that is, they were allowed to
vary across participants. Critically, to test the hypothesis that
devaluation sensitivity is associated with model-based learn-
ing during training, we included devaluation sensitivity (z-
scored) as a between-subjects predictor and tested for interac-
tions with all other factors in the model. We quantified deval-
uation sensitivity as the difference between the numbers of
responses in the valued and devalued states. We hypothesized
that we would find a significant three-way interaction between
reward, transition, and devaluation, such that greater sensitiv-
ity to devaluation would be predictive of greater model-based
control over action (the results are in Table 1 below). In the
syntax of the lme4 package, the specification for the regres-
sion was Stay ~ Reward * Transition * Devaluation + (1 +
Reward * Transition | Subject).
Additionally, we carried out a second analysis aimed at
corroborating the relationship between learning and devalua-
tion sensitivity, but using devaluation sensitivity as the depen-
dent variable, a specification that would more naturally reflect
our causal hypothesis. For this, individual betas from a more
basic model (i.e., like the one described above, but omitting
devaluation sensitivity as a between-subjects predictor) were
first extracted. Individual betas for the Reward × Transition
interaction were termed the Bmodel-based index,^ and indi-
vidual betas for reward were termed the Bmodel-free index.^
These indices (betas) were used as predictors in a linear model
with devaluation sensitivity as the dependent variable. This
analysis was therefore similar to the first analysis, although
it was less sensitive because it failed to account for uncertainty
in estimating the per-subject model-based indices.
Nonetheless, it allowed us to test a causal assumption of our
hypotheses, in so far as we can speak of causality in regres-
sion, that the reinforcement-learning dynamics during training
would be predictive of sensitivity to devaluation of these same
associations (the results are in Table 2). Alternative linear
models were tested, with devaluation sensitivity as the depen-
dent variable, including general task comprehension (the
number of times that participants failed the instruction com-
prehension test) and consumption sensitivity as predictors.
This allowed us to assess whether the relationship between
Table 1 Experiment 1: Results of logistic regression predicting stay
probability
Coefficient β (SE) z Value p Value
(Intercept) 1.05 (0.09) 11.47 <.0001***
Reward 0.68 (0.04) 17.69 <.0001***
Transition –0.01 (0.02) –0.56 .574
Devaluation 0.06 (0.09) 0.61 .541
Reward × Transition 0.08 (0.03) 2.32 .020*
Reward × Devaluation –0.003 (0.04) –0.07 .945
Transition × Devaluation 0.01 (0.02) 0.47 .638
Reward × Transition ×
Devaluation
0.10 (0.03) 3.02 .003**
Significant effects are bold. Reward (rewarded 1, unrewarded –1) and tran-
sition type (common 1, rare –1) are random effects predictors (within sub-
jects), and devaluation sensitivity (z-scored) during the habit test is a fixed
effect (between subjects). A significantmain effect of reward and a significant
Reward × Transition interaction indicate that, in line with previous studies,
participants used a mixture of model-free and model-based learning, respec-
tively. Importantly, a significant interaction between reward, transition, and
devaluation reveals that individuals who behaved habitually at test were less
likely to have used a model-based learning strategy during instrumental
learning. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
Table 2 Experiment 1: Results of linear model predicting devaluation
sensitivity
Predictor β (SE) t Value p Value
(Intercept) 3.42 (0.42) 8.084 <.001***
Model-free index 0.18 (0.43) 0.428 .669
Model-based index 1.26 (0.43) 2.950 .004**
Significant effects are bold. The Bmodel-based index^ (standardized in-
dividual Reward × Transition interaction betas) predicted individual sen-
sitivity to devaluation, p = .004, whereas the Bmodel-free index^ (stan-
dardized individual reward betas) did not. ** p < .01, *** p < .001
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devaluation and the model-based index could be explained by
failures in either of these two aspects of task comprehension.
Correlational analyses were conducted using Spearman’s
rho. Finally, we complemented our main regression analysis
with a full computational reinforcement-learning model, for
which the methods are detailed in the supplementary materials.
Results
We examined participants’ trial-by-trial adjustments in choice
preferences during the initial learning task. Consistent with
previous studies using similar learning tasks (Daw et al.,
2011; Daw et al., 2005; Otto, Gershman, et al., 2013; Otto,
Raio, et al., 2013), we found that they used a mixture of
model-based and model-free learning strategies, evidenced
by the presence of both a main effect of reward (p < .0001;
the hallmark of model-free learning) and a Reward ×
Transition interaction (p = .02; i.e., model-based learning—
see Table 1 and Fig. S1).
To assess whether model-based or model-free learning
strategies were associated with the formation of devaluation-
insensitive habits, we tested for the presence of (1) Reward ×
Devaluation and (2) Reward × Transition × Devaluation inter-
actions. These significant interactions would indicate that a
relationship existed between habits and the strengths of
model-free and model-based learning, respectively. We found
evidence in support of the latter hypothesis, such that partici-
pants who were more model-based during training also
showed larger goal-directed sensitivity to devaluation in the
habit test, (β = 0.1, standard error [SE] = 0.03, p = .003; see
Table 1 and Fig. 3). No such relationship was seen for model-
free responding. Since devaluation sensitivity scores were
standardized for inclusion in the regression model, the esti-
mated coefficients in Table 1 imply that an increase of one
standard deviation in devaluation sensitivity doubles the ob-
servable effect of model-based learning, whereas if
devaluation sensitivity is one standard deviation below the
mean, it eliminates model-based learning altogether.
We confirmed the relationship between a tendency toward
model-based learning and the subsequent devaluation sensi-
tivity of the acquired behaviors in a second version of the
analysis, in which the devaluation sensitivity was taken as
the dependent variable and indices of model-based and
model-free learning from the training phase were used to pre-
dict it. Accordingly, across participants, the individual Reward
× Transition interaction betas (Bmodel-based index^) estimat-
ed from the basic learning model (i.e., with no between-
subjects predictors included) significantly predicted devalua-
tion sensitivity (β = 1.26, SE = 0.43, p = .004), whereas the
reward betas (Bmodel-free index^) did not (β = 0.18, SE =
0.43, p = .669) (Table 2). The distribution of devaluation sen-
sitivity scores was bimodal, with peaks at 0 and 10 (Fig. 4A).
A score of 10 indicated maximum devaluation (goal-di-
rected; all possible responses made in the valued state
and no responses made in the devalued state), whereas a
score of 0 indicated that a participant responded equally
frequently in both states, indicating that his or her be-
havior did not change selectively for the devalued coin
(habit). Therefore, we illustrate this effect using a me-
dian split (Figs. 4B and C), which shows that partici-
pants who remained goal-directed in the devaluation test
(i.e., Bgoal-directed^) showed the characteristic mixture
of both model-based and model-free learning during
training, whereas those who formed habits (Bhabit^)
showed the complete absence of a model-based instru-
mental learning strategy (Fig. 1B).
Reinforcement-learning model The aforementioned regres-
sion analyses considered only events taking place on the trial
immediately preceding choice and were originally motivated as
a simplified limiting case of a more elaborate computational
model of how these two strategies learn action preferences pro-
gressively over many trials (Daw et al., 2011). To verify that the
relationship between model-based learning and subsequent de-
valuation sensitivity would remain when we fully considered
incremental learning taking place over many trials, we addition-
ally fit a computational model to the choice data, in which
separate model-based and model-free systems contributed to
individual participants’ behavior (Daw et al., 2011). The
model-free system uses temporal-difference learning to incre-
mentally update action values on the basis of their history of
reward. The model-based system, in contrast, constructs models
of both the transition and reward structures of the task and
integrates this information in order to prospectively assign
values to possible actions (see the supplemental materials for a
detailed description of the computational model).
We estimated the free parameters of this model for each
individual participant, and also their group-level distributions,
by fitting them to the observed sequences of choices and
Fig. 3 Experiment 1: Effect sizes (beta weights) from the logistic
regression model (Table 1). Significant effects were observed for reward
(model-free, p < .001), the Reward × Transition interaction (model-based,
p = .020), and the predicted three-way interaction of reward, transition,
and devaluation sensitivity (p = .003). rew = reward, trans = transition,
dev = devaluation sensitivity
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rewards (using Markov chain Monte Carlo sampling over a
hierarchical Bayesian model). Notably, the relative balance
between model-based and model-free learning is, in this
framework, captured by a single weight parameter (w), which
is larger when model-based learning is relatively more domi-
nant. At the group level, we estimated a regression slope re-
lating devaluation sensitivity, across subjects, to w, and found
that this was significantly positive, such that the result mir-
rored those in the regression analysis [median = 0.86, 95 %
confidence interval: lower tail 0.04, upper tail 1.94]. Greater
sensitivity to devaluation was associated with a greater rela-
tive contribution of model-based than of model-free learning
signals to choice. This relationship was specific tow, in that no
significant relationship was observed between devaluation
sensitivity and the additional parameters in our model, includ-
ing learning rate and perseveration.
Consumption test We verified the efficacy of the devaluation
procedure by using a post-devaluation consumption test. We
found a main effect of coin value on consumption, F(1, 89) =
247.28, p < .0001, so that, as predicted, participants collected
more valued (M = 5.41, SD = 1.96) than devalued (M = 0.6, SD
= 1.33) coins. This confirmed that the devaluation manipula-
tion was effective. Individual differences in consumption sen-
sitivity, like devaluation sensitivity, were quantified as the dif-
ference between the consumption of valued and devalued
coins, in which a score of 10 indicated a maximal shift in
incentive value toward valued coins, and 0 reflected no differ-
entiation between valued and devalued coins. There was no
significant correlation between devaluation sensitivity and con-
sumption sensitivity (Spearman’s r = .12, p = .278), indicating
that continued responding in the devaluation test was indicative
of habit—that is, was unrelated to the current incentive value of
the outcomes of actions. We furthermore tested whether con-
sumption explained away the relationship between model-
based-index and devaluation sensitivity, by including it as
an additional explanatory variable in our linear regression
in which per-subject devaluation sensitivity was the de-
pendent measure and the per-subject model-based index,
consumption, and their interaction were predictors.
Consumption did not predict devaluation (p = .23), nor
did it interact with the model-based index (p = .631) or
A. 
Habit 
C. 
Devaluation Test 
Goal-DirectedHabitB. 
Goal-Directed 
Fig. 4 Experiment 1: Model-based learning and habit formation. (A)
Histogram displaying devaluation sensitivity in the entire sample in Ex-
periment 1. Devaluation sensitivity is defined as the difference between
the numbers of valued and devalued responses performed in the test stage,
with larger numbers indicating greater sensitivity to devaluation. To
illustrate the relationship between model-based learning and habit forma-
tion, a median split divides the sample into (B) habit (devaluation sensi-
tivity < 1) and (C) goal-directed (devaluation sensitivity > 1) groups.
Those who displayed habits at test showed a marked absence of the
signature of model-based learning, p < .003
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explain away the relationship between the model-based
index and devaluation (which remained significant at p
= .0341).
General comprehension Finally, we tested whether a more
general measure of comprehension ability, the number of
times that participants failed the instruction comprehension
test, was associated with model-based performance. The num-
ber of fails was marginally associated with the model-based
index (Spearman’s r = –.2, p = .063), such that better general
comprehension ability (fewer fails) was associated with a
greater model-based index (note that this was not replicated
in Exp. 2 below). Importantly, when we repeated the regres-
sion analysis above, but replacing consumption with compre-
hension, we found that comprehension did not predict deval-
uation performance (p = .792), nor did it interact with the
model-based index (p = .739) or explain away the relationship
between the model-based index and devaluation (p = .039).
Experiment 2
In Experiment 1, we operationalized habits by the decision
whether or not to engage in any response for the devalued
option, mimicking the classic definition from free-operant
responding in rodents (Adams, 1982). However, because the
devaluation probe (the decision to engage or not to engage)
was distinct from the choice between fractals (i.e., which re-
sponse to make), a questionmay arise whether the devaluation
probe depended on the particular associations learned experi-
entially during the task, or whether it could instead depend
upon more general information that was acquired from the
task instructions. Formally, the expected value of responding
following devaluation was the product of the current value of
the coin times the chance that any subsequently chosen re-
sponse within the MDP would produce that coin, which im-
plied that the decision whether to respond at all should ulti-
mately depend on the same (model-based or model-free)
learned associations that drove the choice between responses.
However, in Experiment 1, it might be possible in principle to
short-circuit this computation and conclude that responding
for the devalued outcome was worthless, because participants
were instructed that the color of the border presented on the
screen (gold or silver) indicated the possible outcome associ-
ated with a response in each MDP. Thus, the result from
Experiment 1 could speak to a more general relationship be-
tween a tendency to be model-based and a tendency to be
goal-directed on separate Btasks^, rather than to the more spe-
cific hypothesis that associations learned in model-based fash-
ion are more sensitive to subsequent devaluation. To address
this possibility, in Experiment 2 we tested a separate sample of
95 participants with a modified version of the paradigm that
could more directly probe the sensitivity to devaluation of
fractal choice associations, which participants acquired in
the training phase using either model-based or model-free
strategies (or a mixture of the two).
Method
In all, 39 males and 56 females were included in Experiment 2,
and their ages ranged from 19 to 70 (M = 34.33 years, SD =
12.03). In this version of the task, we used a single MDP
(instead of the two used in Exp. 1). The two second-stage states
were associated with gold and silver coins, respectively (Fig. 5).
There was no option to withhold responses, which did not come
at a cost. The outcomes were devalued in exactly the same way
as in Experiment 1, but prior to the outcome devaluation, we
stabilized the reward probabilities at .9 and .1 for the second-
stage states associated with the to-be-devalued and to-remain-
valued coin colors, respectively. The second-stage state that
produced the to-be-devalued coin type was always stabilized
to .9, serving to bias participants to this choice prior to devalu-
ation, so that we could examine subsequent habitual responses
toward the devalued outcome against a high pre-devaluation
baseline. Devaluation was randomized across coin colors and
reward drifts. The main MDP task comprised 150 trials, which
were followed by 50 trials of stable reward probabilities (only
the former were used to assess trial-by-trial learning mecha-
nisms). As in Experiment 1, we included four trials with no
feedback prior to devaluing one of the outcomes, in order to
decorrelate these occurrences. The habit test comprised ten trials
with no feedback after participants had been alerted that one of
their coin containers was full. To test for sensitivity to devalua-
tion, we measured the proportion of valued responses selected
in the test stage—that is, trials on which participants did not
choose the devalued outcome. This measure of devaluation sen-
sitivity was then entered into a mixed-effects logistic regression
with the effects of reward, transition, and the intercept taken as
random effects, and devaluation sensitivity as a fixed effect (as
per the main model in Exp. 1). Ninety-nine participants were
tested in Experiment 2, of which three were excluded because
they missed more than 10 % of the total trials during the main
MDP task, and one was excluded for having an implausibly fast
reaction time (>2 SDs lower than the mean).
Results
During the two-stage decision task, participants again
showed evidence of both model-free learning (a main ef-
fect of reward) and model-based learning (an interaction
between reward and transition, both at p < .0001; see
Table 3). In a stable phase at the end of this task, we
successfully induced a choice preference for the action
associated with the to-be-devalued coin color by giving
it a high probability of reward for 50 trials. A one-sample
t test confirmed that the proportion of trials on which
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participants chose the action associated with the high re-
ward probability (M = .716, SD = .27) was greater than
chance (.5), t(94) = 7.71, p < .001. The proportion of
trials on which the high-probability action was selected
was not correlated with the model-based index
(Spearman’s r = .114, p = .272) or the model-free index
(Spearman’s r = .129, p = .212).
In the devaluation test, in line with the results of
Experiment 1, we again observed a range of devaluation sen-
sitivities across the population, ranging between exclusive
choice of the devalued (habit) and still-valued actions
(Fig. 6A). Critically, when entering devaluation sensitivity as
an explanatory factor in the analysis of the two-stage decision
task, we observed a significant three-way interaction between
reward, transition, and devaluation sensitivity (Table 3). In
line with the results from Experiment 1, this indicated that
greater sensitivity to devaluation was associated with an in-
crease in model-based learning (Figs. 6B and C). This con-
firmed that when behavior is acquired in a model-based man-
ner, that behavior is subsequently more sensitive to outcome
devaluation—that is, less likely to be habitual. Additionally,
we observed a main effect of devaluation sensitivity on stay/
switch behavior, such that better sensitivity to devaluation
was associated with a greater tendency to repeat the same
action on subsequent trials, irrespective of reward and transi-
tion. These results were fully echoed in fits using the full
computational model, which are presented in the supplement
(Table S2).
As in Experiment 1, we also recapitulated this analysis
using a fixed-effects model in which devaluation sensitivity
was the dependent measure. Again, we found that the model-
based index predicted devaluation (p = .0002), whereas the
model-free index did not (p = .70). We again tested whether
this relationship might be explained by some more general
factor, and found that this was not the case. The results from
these analysis are presented in the supplement. Unlike in
Table 3 Experiment 2: Results of logistic regression predicting stay
probability
Coefficient β (SE) zValue p Value
(Intercept) 1.62 (0.12) 14.10 <.0001***
Reward 1.06 (0.08) 12.52 <.0001***
Transition 0.05 (0.03) 1.55 .121
Devaluation 0.26 (0.11) 2.25 .024*
Reward × Transition 0.24 (0.04) 5.67 <.0001***
Reward × Devaluation –0.04 (0.08) –0.49 .625
Transition × Devaluation 0.01 (0.03) 0.32 .751
Reward × Transition × Devaluation 0.15 (0.04) 3.55 <.001**
Significant effects are bold. Reward (rewarded 1, unrewarded –1) and
transition type (common 1, rare –1) are random effects predictors (within
subjects), and devaluation sensitivity (z-scored) during the habit test is a
fixed effect (between subjects). Here, devaluation sensitivity refers to the
proportion of presses toward still-valuable outcomes in the habit test. As
in Experiment 1 (see Table 1), we observed a significant main effect of
reward, a significant Reward × Transition interaction, and a significant
three-way interaction between reward, transition, and devaluation, reveal-
ing that individuals who behaved habitually at test (i.e. did not preference
valued over devalued choices) were less likely to have used a model-
based learning strategy during instrumental learning. * p < .05, ** p <
.01, *** p < .001
25¢ 25¢
42% 67%
70%
(common)
70%
(common)
30%
(rare)
A 
2.5s
1s
1s
Fig. 5 Experiment 2: Reinforcement-learning task. (A) Participants en-
tered the same starting state on each trial and had 2.5 s to make a choice
between two fractal stimuli that always appeared in this state. One fractal
commonly (70 %) led to one of the second-stage states and rarely (30 %)
led to the other. In contrast to Experiment 1, each second-stage state was
uniquely associated with a certain type of coin (gold or silver). (B) For the
first 150 trials, reward probabilities (the chance of winning a coin in a
given second-stage state) drifted slowly over time according to Gaussian
random walks. For the next 50 trials, the reward probabilities stabilized at
.9 and .1, for the second-stage states associated with the to-be-devalued
and to-remain-valued outcomes, respectively. This served to systemati-
cally bias all participants toward making the action that would later be
devalued. Devaluation was randomized across coin colors and reward
drifts
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Experiment 1, we found that consumption was related to de-
valuation sensitivity (p = .05), but importantly, as in
Experiment 1, its inclusion in the model did not explain away
the relationship between model-based learning and devalua-
tion sensitivity (p = .006). Likewise, task comprehension was
related to devaluation sensitivity here (p = .018), but again this
did not explain away the relationship between model-based
learning and habits (p = .002). Finally, unlike in Experiment 1,
task comprehension did not significantly correlate with the
model-based index (Spearman’s r = –.16, p = .13).
Discussion
In two complementary experiments, we combined an out-
come devaluation probe with a multistage decision task in
order to characterize the learning dynamics that give rise to
actions or habits. In Experiment 1, habits were operational-
ized traditionally—that is, as failures to withhold costly
responding in light of devaluation (Adams, 1982). In
Experiment 2, we extended this result to habits defined by
a preference for a devalued choice over a still-valued choice,
which have been utilized more recently in human studies
(Schwabe & Wolf, 2009). The latter experiment also ensured
that any effects of devaluation were mediated by associa-
tions learned experientially during the task. Across both ex-
periments, we found that the extent to which actions were
learned using model-based updating during instrumental
training predicted their later sensitivity to devaluation. Put
another way, individuals who did not show the signatures of
model-based learning were more likely to display habits
when the outcomes associated with these learned behaviors
were devalued. These data suggest that signatures of model-
based instrumental learning are an appropriate formalization
of goal-directed behavior, and importantly, that these signa-
tures (which predict the ultimate formation of goal-directed
actions vs. habits) are detectable during initial, trial-by-trial
acquisition. Interestingly, we did not find evidence for a
separate relationship between a signature of model-free
learning and devaluation sensitivity.
A. 
Habit Goal-Directed 
Devaluation Test 
Goal-DirectedHabit C. B. 
Fig. 6 Experiment 2: Model-based learning and habit formation. (A)
Histogram displaying devaluation sensitivity in the entire sample from
Experiment 2. Here, devaluation sensitivity is defined as the proportion of
valued choices (over total choices) made at the test stage, with larger
numbers indicating greater sensitivity to devaluation. To illustrate the
relationship between model-based learning and habit formation, a median
split divides the sample into (B) habit (devaluation sensitivity < .6) and
(C) goal-directed (devaluation sensitivity > .6) groups. Consistent with
Experiment 1, the participants who displayed habits in Experiment 2 (i.e.
failed to prefer valued over devalued choices) showed a reduction in the
signature of model-based learning, p < .001
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Our results converge with recent data showing a correla-
tion, across a small sample of participants, between the results
from two separate tasks, one probing sequential decision-
making and another assessing sensitivity to devaluation
(Friedel et al., 2014). By instead testing within a single task
the devaluation sensitivity of the same associations whose
model-based learning was assessed, through our present de-
sign we were able to address the hypothesized computational
mechanism by which model-based learning produces
devaluation-sensitive behaviors. The present study also con-
trolled for the efficacy of the devaluation manipulation at re-
ducing the desirability of outcomes using consumption and
general task comprehension, factors that might contribute to
either or both tasks and confound their relationship. The
Friedel et al. study is complementary to the present one in
effecting devaluation by using a specific satiety manipulation
(Valentin et al., 2007) that is more similar to the procedures
used in typical rodent studies than is our more explicit, cog-
nitive manipulation.
More generally, the direct relationship between learning type
and devaluation sensitivity that we demonstrated is consistent
with recent patterns of findings using either procedure separate-
ly. For instance, disorders of compulsivity, which are associated
with deficits in goal-directed devaluation sensitivity (Dickinson
et al., 2002; Gillan et al., 2014; Gillan et al., 2011; Sjoerds et al.,
2013), are also accompanied by impairments in model-based,
but not model-free, learning (Voon et al., 2014). Likewise,
stress responses are associated with deficient model-based,
but not model-free, learning (Otto, Raio, et al., 2013), converg-
ing with earlier work showing that stress impairs devaluation
sensitivity in both humans (Schwabe & Wolf, 2009) and ro-
dents (Dias-Ferreira et al., 2009). All of these results suggest
that evoking a model-based strategy during learning—that is,
incorporating the relationship between candidate actions and
future outcomes and the current incentive values of outcomes
into the decision process—is protective against habit formation.
These results are also consistent with the apparent overlap in
the neural loci associated with devaluation sensitivity and
model-based learning (Balleine & O’Doherty, 2010). As we
outlined in the introduction, these processes share a dependence
on the caudate nucleus and the vmPFC (Daw et al., 2011; de
Wit et al., 2009; deWit et al., 2012; Gillan et al., 2015; Valentin
et al., 2007; Voon et al., 2014; Yin et al., 2005).
Although (the absence of) model-based learning predicted
the subsequent dominance of habits, the level of model-free
learning did not. Negative results must be interpreted with cau-
tion, but this may be consistent with an overall structure of
behavioral control in which habits represent a more robust,
prepotent default, which can be effortfully overridden by
model-based decisions if these have been learned (Otto,
Skatova, Madlon-Kay, & Daw, 2015). That we found no evi-
dence for a relationship between individual differences in
model-free learning and habit formation may also be consistent
with neuroimaging data, since there have as yet been fewer
clear indications that habits and model-free learning coincide
neurally than that goal-directed action and model-based learn-
ing do (see Daw & O’Doherty, 2014, for a review). Therefore,
one important implication of the present (null) result is that
model-free learning may be entirely unrelated to habit-
forming tendencies (Dezfouli & Balleine, 2013). Another pos-
sibility is that, rather than two independent dimensions, the
balance between model-based and model-free learning might
be better understood as a single parameter along a spectrum (as
with w in our computational model), which (in this task and
analysis) may be more sensitively detected by the model-based
index. Consistent with either view, the model-based index has
repeatedly proved to be more sensitive to manipulations and
individual differences (Otto, Gershman, et al., 2013; Otto,
Raio, et al., 2013; Otto et al., 2015; Voon et al., 2014;
Wunderlich, Smittenaar, & Dolan, 2012). Finally, we cannot
exclude the possibility that the influence of individual differ-
ences in model-free learning on habit formation is tied to ex-
ternal promoters of habit, such as the duration of training ex-
perienced (Tricomi et al., 2009) or the extents to which learning
is implicit or explicit (the former of which would be expected to
promote model-free learning; Frank, Rudy, Levy, & O’Reilly,
2005). Future studies should aim to tackle these issues and
determine whether a relationship indeed exists between incre-
mental reinforcement learning and habit formation (which is
not explained by goal-directed learning).
It is notable that model-based performance was found to
depend partly on task comprehension. The extent to which
this is particularly relevant to this task (and not a common
feature of most experimental paradigms) is an open question,
but nonetheless, comprehension should be handled carefully,
particularly when using this task in challenged populations. In
Experiment 1, the effect of model-based learning observed
was smaller than the effects observed in Experiment 2 and in
prior studies using the original version of the sequential task.
This is not surprising, given that participants were required to
learn two independent transition structures in Experiment 1,
rather than just one. This change likely rendered model-based
learning more difficult. Additional differences between
Experiment 1 and the original version of this paradigm
(Daw et al., 2011) included the added cost of responding,
the absence of second-stage choices, and a lower overall pay-
ment amount (a feature of both Experiments 1 and 2).
Whereas a previous study has shown that varying the rate of
remuneration between levels that has been typical with AMT
and in-person experiments has little effect on behavior in a
category-learning task (Crump et al., 2013), the first two
changes described above may have affected task behavior—
for instance, by encouraging participants to deliberate more
over their choices or making value representations less distinct
between states, respectively. In future work, it will be possible
to test these possibilities by manipulating the various task
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features separately, but the important point for the present
study is simply that, relative to previous variants of the task,
we retained the key ability to detect significant contributions
of model-based and model-free learning to choice, and thus to
test their relationships to devaluation.
In addition to suggesting that model-based learning signals
are an appropriate formalization of goal-directed control over
action, the data from the present study provide support for the
attractive possibility that biases toward habit formation can be
identified during trial-by-trial learning, allowing researchers
to avoid the practical challenges associated with using one-
shot devaluation tests (Seger & Spiering, 2011). For instance,
a trial-by-trial rather than a one-shot probe approach is much
more amenable to methodologies such as unit recording or
functional magnetic resonance imaging, for which averaging
over many trials is typically necessary. Similarly, and crucial-
ly, the outcome devaluation test can speak only indirectly to
the dynamic mechanisms supporting these respective systems.
Reinforcement-learning frameworks offer the computational
specificity that one-shot assay tests lack in this regard, and
thus have already been used to identify more distributed neu-
ral signatures of instrumental choice (Daw et al., 2011) that
may be critical for advancing our understanding of the rela-
tionship between brain function and compulsivity in psychi-
atric disorders. Overall, this framework provides renewed
scope to directly investigate the hitherto opaque learning
mechanisms through which training duration, contingency,
and value interact to produce habits in both healthy animals
and clinical populations.
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